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Abstract 
 
We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a 
personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players 
decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two 
others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. 
Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a 
randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the 
selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. 
Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly 
selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION. 
 
In many economic and social situations people assign power over the 
distribution of payoffs to others. This is because we live in a world in which contracts 
are incomplete and thus leave considerable discretion. Examples from economic life are 
labor markets with hidden effort and goods markets with variable quality. In this kind of 
markets it is not possible to completely specify the features of the goods or services to 
be transacted. As a consequence, having been hired may give a worker considerable 
power over the distribution of payoffs between herself and the employer. In a similar 
manner the purchase of a good or service of uncontractable quality allows the seller to 
take advantage of her customers. The problem is also present within organizations and 
firms; the assignment of certain tasks to particular employees often entails giving them 
some kind of allocative power. 
In this kind of environments, issues related to cooperative behavior can play a 
prominent role. We know from previous experiments that, in different variants of 
sequential relations, gift exchange is a reliable behavioral phenomenon. Those who act 
first frequently make – at own cost – choices that favor those who act second who then 
take – again at own cost – actions that favor the first movers. 
In the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) a truster can assign 
dictatorial power to a trustee in a continuous way. Let k be the positive monetary 
endowment of the truster and m a multiplier with m>1. For any investment x by the 
truster, with 0<x<k, the trustee receives mx of which she can send any share y, with 
0£y£mx, back to the truster. The data from experiments with this game exhibit both 
considerable investment and pay-back. Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) present the 
gift exchange game and find similar results.  
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The above studies focus on whether the dictator’s choices are affected by the 
procedure by which she has been selected. A relevant behavioral issue may, hence, have 
been left aside. In many instances individuals obtain discretionary power over others 
after having been selected among a pool of candidates. A selection procedure is usually 
considered to have an allocative impact; a good procedure will presumably select the 
candidate with the most appropriate characteristics. The procedure may, however, also 
cause other effects, e.g. the selected party may express gratitude to other parties 
involved. When selecting an employee, employers usually select one person from a pool 
of several candidates. Moreover, employers most often gather considerable information 
about the characteristics of the candidates and decide on that basis. The person that gets 
the job usually knows that the employer has used information about her. If that very fact 
subsequently affected the employee’s behavior then there would be a purely 
psychological reason for following personalized selection processes. This possibility is 
the focus of our study. 
Issues related to the effects of job selection processes have been studied by a 
number of investigators in non-experimental contexts. Hough and Oswald (2000) 
present an overview of current research on personnel selection. Gilliland (1993, p. 727) 
concludes that evaluations of the fairness of the selection process “will have an impact 
on the work behavior of a person who is hired, which is exhibited through work 
performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, his or her attitudes such as job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment, and the organizational climate”. Some 
studies deal directly with applicants’ reactions to positive selection outcomes. Bauer, 
Maertz, Dolen and Campion (1998) find that applicants passing a test for a clerical 
position rated organizational attractiveness, intentions to work for the organization and 
the fairness of the test higher than in their initial reactions. Ployhart, Ryan and Bennett 
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(1999) report that fairness perceptions of cognitive and job knowledge tests increased 
with a positive selection outcome. 
The issue we study is related to the more general theme of whether people’s 
motivation is affected by the process by which an allocation is reached, in other words, 
whether information that is not about the outcome itself is pertinent for predicting 
subjects’ behavior. We are, however, not aware of any experiment or model which 
specifically addresses whether, in a selection situation, the employee’s behavior will 
depend on the procedures by which she has been chosen. We report on an experiment to 
study whether people’s behavior is affected by the very fact that they are selected on the 
basis of information about their personal characteristics. Note that it would be difficult 
to carry out this type of analysis on the basis of field data alone, since in natural 
environments it would be unusual to find data with the desired variations in the 
selection procedure. In contrast, experiments make it possible to generate this kind of 
evidence in a systematic way. 
 We study a simple sequential selection situation and focus on two main 
hypotheses. The first is that selection on the basis of personal information will make the 
selected party more generous towards others. This is what we will refer to as the I-want-
YOU effect. Our second hypothesis, which we will call the gratitude effect, posits that 
the selected party’s increased generosity will favor more the selecting party than other 
parties involved. The first hypothesis refers to a possible change in the goodwill towards 
others in general, while the second refers to a change in the relative disposition towards 
two specific others. Note that the two potential effects are independent from each other. 
We also study the relevance of outside options and some aspects of the behavior of the 
selecting party. 
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2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE. 
As part of our experimental design, we needed to generate information about 
participants’ personal characteristics. To provide this kind of information, at the 
beginning of the experiment all participants were asked to fill out the ‘16 PA-
personality questionaire’. This questionnaire was introduced by Brandstätter (1988) and 
serves as a German and reduced version of a more comprehensive self-rating of 
individual characteristics (see Cattel, Schneewind and Schroeder, 1983). We do not 
view this questionnaire necessarily as an appropriate tool for use in actual selection 
processes in natural settings. It is, however, a good way of obtaining some relevant 
personal information about subjects in our experimental setting.1 
In the questionnaire subjects had to rate themselves on a scale from 1 to 9, on 32 
items related to 16 personality-related dimensions. When answering the questionnaire 
participants did not know about the actual decision task they would subsequently 
participate in. Subjects were then asked to make decisions in a three-person game in 
which they had the fixed role of party X, Y or Z. X is the party that makes the selection 
and Y and Z are the potential dictators or, as we will call them, allocators. 
In the game, see figure 1, the three parties can share a total reward of 12 tokens  
in case that X gives up her outside option, O, which yields q tokens for her and nothing 
for Y and Z. In our experiments q will take on the values 3 and 6. The allocator’s 
distribution of p among the three parties can be described by the vector (x,y,z) with x,y,z 
³ 0 and x+y+z=p. For purely self-interested players the prediction of behavior in these 
games is very straightforward. If either Y or Z has been assigned dictatorial power, she 
will keep the entire pie, p, for herself regardless of how she has been selected. 
Anticipating this, a self-interested player X will always choose O, since q is positive. 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Our main treatments differ only in what happens when X gives up her outside 
option. The selected allocator (hereafter, SA) treatment represents the selection 
situation discussed above: Party X can freely decide whether she gives up the outside 
option and whether she wants Y or Z to be the allocator. The SA treatment corresponds 
to the competitive environment we are mainly interested in. X can be seen as an 
employer or manager who has to hire one of the two employees or assign a task to one 
of them on the basis of available personal information about the candidates.  
As a natural control for the SA treatment we conducted the random allocator 
(hereafter, RA) treatment in which, for the case that X gave up her outside option, the 
distributive power was randomly assigned to either Y and Z, with a probability of ½ 
each. Note that this procedure provides an unbiased benchmark at which personal 
characteristics can not influence the choice between Y and Z.  
Each session extended over three rounds; players’ roles remain fixed over all 
three rounds. The only difference between rounds was that q was equal to 3 tokens in 
rounds 1 and 2 and equal to 6 tokens in round 3, which allows us to study the influence 
of variations in outside options. We used a round-robbin matching procedure and, 
hence, guaranteed that no participant was ever matched twice with the same partner in 
different rounds. In addition, subjects were not informed about the outcomes in rounds 1 
and 2 until after the end of round 3. We decided to obtain more than one measurement 
from each subject to study differences between earlier and later play. We, however, used 
a procedure that avoided feedback effects so that changes in behavior over time can not 
be influenced by information of others’ past behavior. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 An English translation of the personality questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
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The answers to the personality questionnaire were used in both treatments. 
Player X could consult the answers of the two participants who had the Y and Z roles in 
her group, before choosing between O and D and, in the SA treatment, also between DY 
and DZ. She just had to enter into the computer the number corresponding to a certain 
question and instantly obtained the respective answers for the Y and Z players she was 
matched with. She was neither restricted in terms of time nor by the number of 
questions she was allowed to consult. The requests for information by X were recorded 
by the computer. This yields information about how much and which information X’s 
decision for or against O and, in the SA treatment, for Y or for Z, is based on. Only 
rather few items of the personality questionnaire were consulted by participants in the 
role of player X; we will come back to this fact in section 3.2. 
 In our experiments we followed the strategy elicitation method, i.e. we asked 
players Y and Z to decide in case they were selected. There is some empirical evidence 
that the form of play can make a difference (e.g., Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson, 1994).  
While there is no consensus on why this is so, a possible explanation is that spontaneous 
play tends to evoke a hot, or more emotional, response, while the conditional form of 
play used here tends to evoke a cold, or more studied, response.  In our context, 
conditional play might diminish the impact of the selection procedure, thereby 
dampening down some of our treatment effects.2  
The experiment was performed in the computer laboratory of the economics 
faculty of Humboldt-University in Berlin.3 The software was written with the help of the 
z-tree software package (Fischbacher, 1999). We conducted two sessions for each of the 
treatments. Each session had 15 participants who were randomly assigned to one of the 
                                                          
2 Brandts and Charness (2000) find little evidence for this conjecture in the context of two-player 
sequential prisoner’s dilemma and chicken games, using a no-feedback design. 
3 Appendix B contains a translation of the instructions. 
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three roles X, Y and Z. We, therefore, had a total of 
2(treatments)x2(sessions)x15(participants per session=60 participants.4 This means that 
we had observations for 10 subjects in each of X, Y and Z roles in each of the 
treatments. Due to the use of the strategy method we could pool the observations of 20  
subjects in either Y or Z role and analyze them together as second mover data.  
 
3. RESULTS. 
The data file of each participant in the X role consists of her answers to the 
personality questionnaire and, for each of the three rounds, of her information requests 
about Y and Z’s answers to the questionnaire and her decisions in the game. For 
participants in the role of Y or Z the data only include the first and third of the above 
three items. Although participants decide repeatedly, when comparing behavior in the 
same round each individual decision was treated as an independent observation, since 
no feedback on others’ behavior was provided between rounds. Thus the only statistical 
drawback arises when we pool the data from different rounds, e.g. from rounds 1 and 2 
with q=3, for the same subject.  
We will start with the analysis of behavior of subjects in the Y and Z roles. Since 
they are the second movers in the game, their decisions can not be influenced by 
strategic considerations and will depend exclusively on motivational factors. To 
complete the picture we then study some features of X’s behavior,  
 
3.1. The behavior of second movers (Y and Z). 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of how the Y and Z players - in the table  
                                                          
4 The minimum, average and maximum payoff were 10, 18.6 and 34 DM, including a show-up fee of 10 
DM. 1 DM equals .5 Euro. A typical session needed around 45 minutes, 10 minutes for filling out the 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
referred to as allocators – distribute the 12 units of the pie between the three 
participants. The decisions of Y and Z are pooled, since these two roles are ex ante 
identical. The data shown in table 1 correspond to all the information we have about the 
behavior of Y and Z, i.e. it includes the decisions of both those allocators that were 
actually chosen and those who were avoided. Table 1, hence reflects Y’s and Z’s 
behavior without conditioning on first players’ behavior. In section 3.2 below we will 
show related information for which the X players’ behavior will be taken into account. 
Note, in passing, the confirmation in both treatments of the well-known result that 
subjects give away considerable amounts in situations in which a player has all the 
distributive power. 
We first want to focus on evidence pertaining to the I-want-YOU effect, i.e. on 
the effect of the treatment on the share kept by the allocator. The evidence in table 1 
leads to our first regularity.  
 
 Regularity 1: 
In round 1, knowingly selected allocators keep less for themselves than 
randomly chosen ones. 
 
In a descriptive sense, regularity 1 holds for all three rounds, since the mean demands by 
allocators in rounds 1, 2 and 3 are 8.65, 9.85 and 9.35 for RA and only 6.75, 8.45 and 
8.95 for SA. However, using a Mann-Whitney U-test, it is significant in round 1, with a 
p-value of p=0.040, and not in rounds 2 and 3. If, in spite of the repeated measurement 
issue, one pools the data from rounds 1 and 2, involving the same outside option, the p-
value is p=0.027. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
standard personal questionaire, 10 minutes for reading the instructions and privately answering clarifying 
 
 
10
Recall that we use a no-feedback design so that the difference between rounds 
can not be explained by learning from past outcomes. One possible interpretation of the 
absence of a statistically significant effect in rounds 2 and 3 is that round 1 behavior 
corresponds to a hot or more emotional reaction while behavior in rounds 2 and 3 is 
colder or more studied and reflects what people do on second thoughts.5 If this 
interpretation is correct then one can conceive of the effect we find for round 1 as the 
expression of some additional goodwill which will only be present in the initial stages 
of the relation that starts with the selection process. 
The data shown in table 2 give some additional information about second mover 
Insert Table 2 about here 
behavior. The third and fourth column shows the number # of players that kept more 
than half the pie and kept half the pie or less, respectively. In the fifth to ninth column 
the results of binomial tests are displayed that show whether a proportion P of 
participants that keep an amount smaller or equal to 6 lies below the given percentage. 
The cells with no entries correspond to cases where the actual proportion is already 
larger than posited by the corresponding hypothesis. 
 A first result here is that in all three rounds of both treatments the proportion of 
subjects is always larger than 10%, the largest p-value being p=0.043. Additionally, in 
all three rounds of the SA-treatment, the proportion is significantly larger than 20 % 
with p-values less than 5 percent, but not so in the RA-treatment. Here the proportion is 
only significantly higher the 20 % in round 1, with a p-value of p=0.087. The result we 
wish to highlight is that for the first round of SA we can reject the hypothesis that the 
proportion of subjects that keep 6 or less is smaller than 40% (p=0.021), while for RA in 
round 1 the actual proportion is already smaller than 40%.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
questions and about10 minutes,7 minutes,7 minutes for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd round. 
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 The next regularity summarizes the information from table 2 that we wish to 
highlight: 
 
Regularity 2: 
In round 1 of the selected allocator treatment (SA) the proportion of subjects 
who keep 6 or less is significantly larger than 40% while for round 1 of RA the 
hypothesis that the proportion is less than 20% cannot be rejected. 
 
Taken together regularities 1 and 2 are our evidence in favor of the I-want-YOU 
effect. The question now is whether we can go, in a sense, one step further and find 
evidence for the gratitude effect.  
Table 3 shows by treatment and round, the number of cases in which X  
Insert Table 3 about here 
obtained more, the same or less than the third party. It also shows the results of a two-
tailed Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test which tests the null hypothesis of no difference 
against the ”gratitude hypothesis” that X receives more than the third party. As can be 
seen in round 1 the effect is significant at the 5% level for SA but not significant for RA 
in any of the three rounds. 
 
Regularity 3: 
In round 1 of the selected allocator treatment (SA) the allocator gives more to X 
than to the remaining player. 
 
 We can at this point summarize and comment on the validity of our main 
hypotheses. The data are consistent with the I-want-YOU and gratitude effects in first 
reactions (round 1). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 One can also think of the fading away of the I-want-YOU effect in terms of some kind of satiation. 
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Our final observation concerning second mover behavior is about the influence 
of X’s outside option on allocator’s behavior. On the basis of the data in table 1 we can 
state the following. 
 
Regularity 4: 
The outside option has no effect since: 
1.  X players receive less than the outside option, 
2. Its size (3 or 6) has no effect on the distribution of the pie. 
 
At first sight, regularity 4 may seem surprising since, as mentioned above, 
second movers have been found to make their choices among outcomes available to 
them dependent on the alternatives available to first movers (see, for instance, Brandts 
and Solà (2001) and Charness and Rabin (forthcoming)). Nevertheless, our result may 
be rationalized in the following way. In our game both outside options are very unfair, 
since they give 100% of the smaller pie to the X player. (In comparison, actual mean 
behavior in our round 2 gives shares of 17.1%, 70.4% and 12.5% to the three players.) 
Therefore, in both cases, player X’s giving up of her outside option is rather seen as a 
duty than as an act of generosity and, hence, does not affect the allocator’s subsequent 
behavior. This possibility is unaffected by the change in X’s outside option.6 
 
3.2. First mover behavior. 
First mover behavior is influenced by both strategic and motivational considerations 
which can not be easily disentangled. In addition we have fewer data – 10 independent 
decisions per treatment - for first than for second movers. The information that we 
                                                          
6 In a related game, the lost wallet game, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) also find that the size of the 
outside option does not affect allocators’ behavior.  
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present in this section should, hence, just be seen as a descriptive complement to the 
results presented earlier.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 gives some insight into the interplay between the decisions of X and of 
those of the allocators. It shows descriptive statistics for the amounts allocated by the 
allocator to the three players involved, distinguishing between actually chosen, c, and 
avoided, a.7  The information contained in this table has a somewhat different character 
than the one shown in table 1. Although these data still show cold conditional responses 
given by second players, they correspond to that subset of conditional responses which 
player X has, through her choice, made relevant for payoff determination. 
The feature of this table which we want to highlight at this point is that in round 
3 the X players, in both the SA and the RA treatment, obtain, from chosen allocators, 
more than half the total pie. This remark is, however, based on very few observations, so 
that we only can say that we have a hint that, both in SA and RA, X players learn to 
select allocators who favor them. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 Table 5 gives information per round and per treatment of those items in the 
questionnaire which at least in one of the treatments were among the top ten of 
consulted items.8 Item 23 asks for (in)dependence, 4 for (not) being headstrong, 3 for 
(not) trusting, 24 for (not) being cool, 2 for whether one is slow or quick in thinking, 18 
for (no) willingness to experiment and 7 for (not) trying to be independent.9 One can say 
that X participants have frequently tried to find out more about the potential allocators 
                                                          
7 Since in the RA-treatment the selection by X is purely hypothetical we stated the amounts of both 
players, Y and Z, as chosen when X decided to distribute the pie. 
8 Whenever a X player consulted an item in the questionnaire, she obtained the information corresponding 
to both the Y and the Z player she was paired with. 
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where the most frequently retrieved items are related to trustworthiness, analytical 
talents and social independence.10 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
We have experimentally studied interdependent motivation in a three-person 
situation in which a player may assign power over the distribution of a pie to one of two 
other players. Our main findings are what we have called the I-want-YOU and gratitude 
effects. The results show that selection may have purely psychological effects, which, in 
our case, are not negative in any sense. Other stylized facts of this kind may continue to 
arise and call for more encompassing types of models. 
 We feel that the effects we find are potentially important phenomena since 
selection situations are quite pervasive, specially in the labor market and in 
organizations, but also in more personal matters like the selection of a marriage partner. 
The type of regularities we observe may be interpreted as reflecting considerable 
emotional involvement of subjects. A selection situation is probably a highly 
interpersonal affair. In his discussion of selection as a social process, Herriott (1989, 
p.171) states: “Selection is not the gate through which applicants must pass before they 
can relate to the organization; it is itself part of the relationship”. 
Recall that our results are obtained with the cold strategy method in an 
experimental lab. Behavior in an experiment with the (moderately) hot direct-response 
method, or even in a naturally ocurring situation should not be expected to produce 
smaller I-want-YOU and gratitude effects than the ones we have reported on here.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
9 For the meaning of the other most frequently consulted items, please go to appendix A. 
10 A statistical test rejects the null hypothesis of X being equally interested in all questions in favor of the 
alternative of concentration on a subset of questions. 
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Table 1: Amounts Assigned by Allocators to X, Herself and the Remaining Player 
 
Treatments RA SA 
Round Shares 
Of the pie p 
X Allocator 3rd  player  X Allocator 3rd  player 
Mean 1.95 8.65 1.4 3.3 6.75 1.95 
Mode 0 12 0 0 4 0 
S.d. 1.76 2.88 1.56 2.92 3.6 1.73 
Min 0 4 0 0 0 0 
 
 
1 
Max 4 12 4 12 12 4 
Mean 1.35 9.85 .8 2.05 8.45 1.5 
Mode 0 12 0 0 12 0 
S.d. 2.21 3.08 1.4 2.23 3.59 1.7 
Min 0 4 0 0 4 0 
 
 
2 
Max 7 12 4 6 12 4 
Mean 1.95 9.35 .7 1.95 8.95 1.1 
Mode 0 12 0 0 12 0 
S.d. 3.35 3.75 1.334 2.81 3.73 1.77 
Min 0 0 0 0 3 0 
 
 
3 
Max 12 12 4 8 12 6 
 
 
Table 2: Results of Binomial Tests for the Proportion of Allocators that keep half 
the pie or less 
Treatment Round # > 6 # £  6  P £ 
10% 
P £ 
20% 
P £ 
30% 
 P £ 
40% 
P £ 
50% 
1 7 13 .000 .000 .001 .021 .134 
2 11 9 .000 .010 .113 .404 - 
 
 
SA 3 12 8 .000 .032 .228 - - 
1 13 7 .002 .087 .392 - - 
2 15 5 .043 .370 - - - 
 
 
RA 3 15 5 .043 .370 - - - 
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Table 3: Comparison between the shares of X and the Third Player 
  
Round 
 
X mean 
3rd  
player 
mean  
#  
3rd  < X 
#  
3rd > X 
# 
3rd = X 
2-tailed 
test 
1 3.3 1.95 6 2 12 .049 
2 2.05 1.5 4 1 15 .176 
 
SA 3 1.95 1.1 5 1 14 .172 
1 1.95 1.4 5 2 13 .149 
2 1.35 .8 2 1 17 .285 
 
RA 3 1.95 .7 4 1 15 .138 
 
Table 4: Comparison of the Amounts Allocated by Chosen and Avoided 
Allocators. 
 
SA/X SA/alloc. SA/3rd RA/X RA/alloc. RA/3rd 
 
Round Statistic 
c A c a C a c a C a c a 
N 7 13 7 13 7 13 16 4 16 4 16 4 
Mean 2 4 8 6,08 2 1,92 1,88 2,25 8,69 8,5 1,43 1,25 
Mode 3 4 12 4 0 0 0 4 12 4 0 0 
s.d. 1,63 3,27 3,12 3,68 1,73 1,8 1,75 2,06 2,87 3,42 1,55 1,89 
Min 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 0 0 
 
 
1 
Max 4 12 12 12 4 4 4 4 12 12 4 4 
N 7 13 7 13 7 13 8 12 8 12 8 12 
Mean 3,14 1,46 6,86 9,31 2 1,23 1,25 1,41 9,5 10,1 1,25 0,5 
Mode 4 0 4 12 0 0 0 0 12 12 0 0 
s.d. 2,26 2,07 3,63 3,4 2 1,54 1,75 2,54 3,51 2,91 1,75 1,17 
Min 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 
 
 
2 
Max 6 6 12 12 4 4 4 7 12 12 4 3 
N 2 18 2 18 2 18 2 18 2 18 2 18 
Mean 7 1,39 3,5 9,56 3,5 0,5 7 1,39 5 9,83 0 0,78 
Mode 6 0 3 12 3 0 6 0 4 12 0 0 
s.d. 1,41 2,33 0,7 3,42 0,58 1,37 1,41 3,01 1,41 3,63 0 1,4 
Min 6 0 3 3 3 0 6 0 4 0 0 0 
 
 
3 
Max 8 7 4 12 4 4 8 12 6 12 0 4 
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Table 5: Most Frequently Consulted Items in the Personality Questionnaire 
Treatment RA SA 
Round 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Question 
number 
Total number of 
requests 
65 69 50 74 81 45 
23 40 6 5 4 5 5 4 
4 38 3 4 3 4 6 2 
9 38 2 6 4 6 6 2 
24 35 4 5 2 5 4 2 
2 33 3 3 2 6 6 1 
18 32 5 6 2 3 5 1 
11 28 2 3 2 6 3 2 
7 25 4 2 3 3 2 2 
19 25 5 2 0 4 2 2 
10 22 2 2 1 0 4 3 
32 20 1 2 2 3 3 3 
25 19 1 4 2 1 2 1 
6 19 3 2 0 1 2 1 
3 16 2 2 4 1 0 2 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental Design 
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Appendix A: Translated Questionnaire. 
 
In what follows you will find a list of personal qualities. Please describe yourself using this list by 
indicating in each row by means of a cross to what extent either the left or the right quality applies to you. 
Even if in some cases you would like to say, that depending on the circunstances both qualities apply or 
that the qualities do not constitute contradictions, you should only choose one of the values between 1 and 
9 and, thereby, indicate which of the two qualities is more accurate. Since all responses are anonymous 
you can indicate without worrying what you really think of yourself. There is nobody on who you need to 
make a good impression. Only if you answer very honestly can the results be used. 
 
1. Matter-of-fact   O O O O O O O O O   Outgoing 
2. Slow thinker   O O O O O O O O O   Quick thinker 
3. Easy to upset  O O O O O O O O O   Emotionally stable 
4. Ready to adapt  O O O O O O O O O   Headstrong 
5. Quiet   O O O O O O O O O   Lively 
6. Careless   O O O O O O O O O   Conscientious 
7. Timid   O O O O O O O O O   Daring 
8. Thick-skinned  O O O O O O O O O   Sensitive 
9. Trusting   O O O O O O O O O    Distrustful 
10. Realistic   O O O O O O O O O   Dreamy 
11. Direct   O O O O O O O O O   Diplomatic 
12. Self-satisfied  O O O O O O O O O   Self-doubting 
13. Holding on to the usual O O O O O O O O O   Open to changes 
14. Needing support  O O O O O O O O O   Self-reliant 
15. Lacking self-control  O O O O O O O O O   Disciplined 
16. Balance   O O O O O O O O O   Irritable 
17. Tense   O O O O O O O O O   Cool 
18. Happy to experiment  O O O O O O O O O Oriented to what has been tried and tested 
19. Trained in reflection  O O O O O O O O O   Untrained in reflection 
20. Sensitive   O O O O O O O O O   Tough 
21. Anxious   O O O O O O O O O   Carefree 
22. Full of fantasy  O O O O O O O O O    Down-to-earth 
23. Self-assertive  O O O O O O O O O   Ready to subordinate 
24. Warm-hearted  O O O O O O O O O   Cold 
25. Firm-principled  O O O O O O O O O   Easygoing 
26. Critical   O O O O O O O O O   Lenient 
27. Likes to be independent O O O O O O O O O    Likes to be with others 
28. Cultivated   O O O O O O O O O   Natural 
29. Self-controlled  O O O O O O O O O   Changeable 
30. Self-assured   O O O O O O O O O   Shy 
31. Emotionally resistant  O O O O O O O O O   Emotionally fragile 
32. Hungry for experiences O O O O O O O O O   Needing quietness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
Appendix B: Instructions. 
Welcome and thank you very much for your disposition to participate in this experiment. Any 
contact to other participants in this room is from on not allowed any more. If you have questions, raise 
your hand and we will come to your seat. 
First please fill out a questionnaire (see also the sample questionnaire). Please answer the 
questions from your personal perspective, by clicking on the scale to what degree the left or the right 
quality applies to you. Please answer all questions seriously. You answers to the questionnaires as well as 
during the subsequent experiments will of course be treated anonymously. This means, nobody will learn 
about your identity just as you will not learn anything about the identity of the other participants. 
You will receive more instructions after having filled out the questionnaire. 
 
Thank you very much for filling out the questionnaires. The actual experiment starts now. Please 
continue to be quiet and avoid any communication with the other participants. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand.  
The instructions for this experiment are identical for all participants. 
The experiment consists of three rounds. In each round 3 participants interact with each other 
who will be called X, Y and Z. Whether you act as X, Y or Z will be randomly determined at the 
beginning of the experiment and communicated to you. Your role will be unchanged throughout the 
experiment. In each round two new participants will be randomly assigned to you. You will, however, not 
meet any oparticipant more than once. 
The first two rounds develop according to the following pattern. 
A money amount of 12.00 DM kann be divided between X, Y and Z. Whether it gets to a division of the 
total amount, is initially decided by participant X. Prior to her decisions X can ask for and consult answers  
given by Y and Z  to the questions.11 Naturally the anonymity of the different participants is kept. X 
knows only that the responses come from a Y or X assigned to him. 
Then X can choose between two variants: 
 
Variant 1: The total money amount of 12:00 DM is not split. Participant X receives an amount of 
x=3.00DM. Participants Y and Z receive nothing. 
                                                          
11 To do this X just has to enter into the computer the numbers corresponding to the quality-pairs that he is 
interested in. (For the corresponding numbers see the sample questionnaire). 
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Variant 2: The total money amount of 12:00 DM is split. In this case participant Y or participant Z 
decides what part of the total amount the three participants (X, Y and Z) receive. Whether Y Or Z decides 
about the split-up is determined by participant X. (Whether X or Y decides about the split-up will be 
determined randomly (with equal chance)). 
This means: X decides between Variant 1 and Variant 2. In case he chooses Variant 2 X decides also 
whether Y or Z determines the split-up of the total amount. Participants Y and Z make their proposal for 
the split-up of the total amount without knowledge of the choice of X. Their decisions become effective if 
X chooses Variant 2 and the corresponding participant (Y or Z) is determined by X for the split-up of the 
total amount. 
 
Round 3 develops according to a similar pattern. The only difference with the preceding rounds is that in 
case of choosing Variant 1 X obtains a money amount of x = 6.00 DM. 
 
Please note that at the beginning of each round you will be assigned two new participants such that 
you never interact more than once with one of the assigned participants. 
 
At the end of the experiment (after decisions for all 3 rounds will have been made) all participants will be 
informed for the different rounds about 
 
- what Variant was chosen by X, 
- in case Variant 2 was chosen, whose decision became effective (the one of Y or the one of 
Z), 
- what payoff the participant earned in the different rounds and what total payoff resulted from 
that. 
 
In addition to the payoff you obtain in the rounds, you will receive a participation fee of 10.00 DM, which 
will be part of your total payoff. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
